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Italian Irredentism During the
Near Eastern Crisis, 1875-78 The Near Eastern crisis opened a new era in the history of Irredentism within the Italian kingdom. During the preceding decade the movement had been confined to a small, unorganized but active group of propagandists. These were rarely concerned with the unredeemed territories subject to France and Switzerland but sought the redemption of the Trentino, Trieste, and Istria, all possessions of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Disagreements naturally existed among them as to the extent of, and reasons for, acquisitions in these parts. Some were content to demand only the Trentino and a rectification of the eastern frontier to the Isonzo; some asked for all of the three provinces. This divergence of opinion developed because one group was anxious to satisfy ethnic ambitions, the other the strategic requirements of national defense. Despite these differences of detail, the early Irredentists were uniformly of the belief that their task was educational. They aimed at keeping the government always aware of the necessity for redemption while at the same time instilling in the public the desire for that achievement. They were united in frowning upon the use of violence, feeling that acquisition could be made peacefully through agreements to which Austria herself would willingly consent. Some rested their hope for this solution upon the belief that the Habsburg empire was destined to become Slav in the near future and would then have no serious objection to sacrificing her Italian subjects. Others were convinced that the instability of European peace would involve Austria in international disturbances which would make concessions on the Italian frontier essential to imperial security. This latter possibility did not seem remote, and the Irredentists felt that if the government at Rome knew how to profit by the anticipated [24] disturbances affairs could be so regulated that the peaceful acquisition of the Irredentist provinces would naturally follow. There was the hope that a great European crisis would provide the occasion for the fulfilment of their aspirations. [1] The newspapers of the peninsula did not reflect any extensive popular interest in the Irredentist movement of this decade, [2] but sympathy for its program was certainly not lacking in official quarters at Florence and Rome. King Victor Emmanuel II and the great leaders of the Right, such as Baron Ricasoli, Alfonso La Marmora, Luigi Menabrea, and Emilio Visconti-Venosta, all hoped, in varying degrees, for the gratification of Irredentist aspirations.[3] They lent no encouragement to popular [25] agitation but did not hesitate at opportune times to negotiate for rectifications of the Austrian frontier, particularly at the termination of the War of 1866 and during the negotiations for a triple alliance between France, Austria, and Italy against Prussia.[4] Each time major obstacles intervened to prevent success. What is significant is not that these undertakings failed, but rather that even governments of the Right were willing to seek Irredentist profit from disturbed situations abroad. Under these circumstances it was inevitable that the crisis in the Near East (1875-78) should have given rise to the most sanguine hopes among Irredentist sympathizers. Conditions seemed to present an ideal situation. Austria could not tolerate nationalization of the Slavs upon her frontier, for that would accelerate the already powerful centrifugal forces within the empire. Nor could she allow domination of the Balkans by another power, since her own political and economic interests would thereby be jeopardized. Austria was necessarily entangled in the Balkan web. On the other hand, Italy had no interests in the Near East which involved her so deeply, and seemingly could cast her lot with that party in the Balkan dispute which could offer the most satisfactory terms for her services. The Irredentists naturally supposed that Austria would seek the co-operation of Italy; and they believed the government at Rome could then demand and secure part or all of the Trentino, Trieste, and Istria, provided the negotiations were wisely conducted. [26] Those who propagated the cause in this sense since 1866 were immediately excited to feverish activity, particularly [Istrians] Carlo Combi and Tomaso Luciani, the two greatest Irredentist leaders of the decade. They sought to encourage the government to action while simultaneously attempting to enliven and extend their own agencies of propaganda. Efforts were made to reestablish the officially supported comitati veneti, annexationist societies which had functioned in Italy prior to and during the War of 1866. [5] The personal support of ministers was solicited.[6] More than once Combi and Luciani memorialized the government to utilize the opportunity afforded by the crisis for the peaceful solution of the Irredentist problem.[7] In the meantime Combi and Luciani prepared to extend the work of the Comitato triestino-istriano, their own Irredentist organization and the only one of its kind before 1877. This society had been formed in Trieste in 1859 and was used thereafter as a medium of propaganda for the eastern provinces. Its members were drawn largely from Trieste and Istria until a branch of the organization was established at Venice after the War of 1866. This Venetian offshoot was the only subdivision in the peninsula for some years, being used mainly as the agency through which direct contact with sympathizers of the littoral could be maintained. It did not engage frequently or actively in public agitation within the kingdom. Combi and Luciani now believed that the time had arrived for the Comitato to emerge from its comparative obscurity. Plans were formulated to enlarge the scope of its work so that it might contribute more directly to the creation of favorable public sentiment. Reorganization in this sense began in 1877 with the establishment of a branch at Rome.[8] [27] The results of these efforts to win the government and the public to the moderate plan of action proved disappointing. Government officials, while profuse in their protestations of hope, seemed indifferent and would promise nothing.[9] And that section of the public now actively sympathetic to the cause of the Irredentist provinces demanded the type of violent agitation against which the moderates had frequently protested. The branch of the Comitato established at Rome fell into the hands of these new and ardent actionists who ignored the advice and counsel of its founders. Unable to control the committee at Rome which they were instrumental in creating, Combi and Luciani shortly severed their connections with it.[10] The direction of the Irredentist movement was rapidly slipping from the hands of the moderates. The Near Eastern crisis had indeed presented the opportunity for which they hoped, but it also facilitated the growth of an Irredentism with which they were in disagreement. This new Irredentism, appearing in 1876, was characterized by its radical, intransigent spirit, reflecting in its way the dominant political tendencies of the era. Liberalism had been accorded its first success with the accession of the Left to power in March, 1876. The members of advanced groups within this liberal movement were not solely concerned with the extension of political liberties at home, but likewise demanded a liberal, active, nationalistic foreign policy. Among these, the republican element was most persistent in asserting the right of each ethnic group to determine its own political destiny. Austria appeared to them as the great negation of this sacred right and the most typical example of political despotism. They enthusiastically hoped that the Balkan disturbances would hasten the process of imperial dissolution. The Irredentists of this group naturally, therefore, had no scruples about injuring Austria and, unlike Combi and Luciani of the moderate school, were willing to use violence and precipitate war against the empire, if necessary. [28] While not republican, the Left which took over the government in 1876 aroused keen enthusiasm among Irredentist sympathizers of the radical stamp. This was natural in view of the expressed or assumed sympathies of its three most conspicuous leaders—Agostino Depretis, Francesco Crispi, and Benedetto Cairoli. Of this group, Depretis was most careful not to commit himself; but his Irredentist leanings were nevertheless understood. Although he denied these before the foreign representatives at Rome, he gave indirect evidence of them through his support of Crispi's mission in 1877; and, although he sought official escape, he appears to have co-operated with the Irredentists at the Avezzana funeral in 1879.[11] Crispi likewise attempted to avoid open commitments, but he did not hesitate secretly to encourage the Irredentists financially; nor did he refrain from suggesting Irredentist acquisitions for Italy during his famous European tour.[12] Cairoli was less politic than Depretis and Crispi in the expression of his pronounced Irredentist sympathies. In 1876, at the commemoration of the battle of Legnano, and the following year, at Mentana, he spoke passionately against Austria and in behalf of the Irredentist provinces. Such uncompromising public pronouncements and the knowledge of his close attachment to the Trentino, established by his marriage to a prominent Italian family of that province, induced the Irredentists to rely upon Cairoli for inspiration and support.[13] [29] The implied or expressed sympathies of these various leaders was unquestionably an important factor contributing to the formation of a radical Irredentist society during the Near Eastern crisis. The new organization, largely republican in membership, was named the Societ à in pro dell'Italia irredenta.[14] It was founded at Naples, May 21, 1877, at the instigation of Matteo Renato Imbriani, a Neapolitan and a conspicious leader of the republican cause in the peninsula. Endowed with the gifts of an orator, with a charming and forceful personality, Imbriani was well fitted for the task of directing the radical Irredentists.[15] Closely associated with him in the formation of the Società was Giovanni Bovio, a member of the staff at the University of Naples, and General Giuseppe Avezzana, likewise a disciple of Mazzini.Nine months after the announcement of its creation, in February, 1878, there was held at Naples the first general meeting of the Società, with two hundred and eighty-five members present. At this assembly General Avezzana was elected president of the organization, and a constitution defining its scope and plan of action was approved.[16] The latter document is significant. Article I explained that the purpose of the Società was to assist in redeeming Italian territory still subjected to foreign dominion. Article II, however, recommended that the efforts of members be confined to the redemption of territory most necessary to Italy at the moment, and for which the prevailing unrest in the Balkans offered the prospect of successful action. This meant specifically the Austrian possessions of the Trentino, Trieste, and Istria. It was vaguely stated that the Società would "avail itself of all legal means" for the accomplishment of this end, a provision which was certainly not considered binding after the Congress of Berlin. [30] The constitution provided for an unlimited number of members, chosen from the male population over eighteen years of age, both in Italy and abroad. The only requirements for admission were a pledge to support the "unity, independence, and liberty of the Patria" and payment of the necessary dues— 5 lire upon admission and 2 lire monthly thereafter. The task of directing this organization was to rest with a committee of thirteen selected annually. Four times each year it was to report to the assembly of the Società, and was required to retire when it no longer enjoyed the confidence of the majority.[17] Beside the governing committee of thirteen with headquarters at Naples, provision was made for three subordinate types of committees (organization, communication, and auxiliary) to be located at strategic points in the peninsula. There were thirteen committees of organization—ten originally, with three subsequently added: one each at Naples, Rome, Florence, Leghorn, Ancona, Cesena, Genoa, Turin, Milan, Venice, Palermo, and Messina.[18] The committees of communication, designed to maintain close contact with the unredeemed provinces, were divided into two general groups, one for the section of the Julian Alps (Trieste and Istria) and the other for the Rhetic Alps (the Trentino). For the former there were four committees, stationed at Udine, Ancona, Venice, and Ravenna. For the latter there were three, one each at Verona, Desenzano, and Feltre. The auxiliary committees were located at Catanzaro, Cosenza, Potenza, Castrogiovanni, Aquila, Benevento, Viterbo, Velletri, Leghorn, Terni, Padua, Carrara, Lucca, Messina, and Castravale. Provision was also made for committees to function within in the Irredentist provinces themselves. There was likewise drawn up a list of persons sympathetic to the Irredentist cause, designated as "correspondents" of the Società.[19] It is clear that the activities of the Società were intended to be national in [31] scope, as contrasted with the limited work of the Comitato of Combi and Luciani. In most instances Imbriani indicated in his journal who assumed the leadership of each of the subordinate committees, though names are lacking for Bologna, Genoa, and Milan. Of those mentioned, few were conspicuous in later agitation. At Rome there was stationed Eugenio Popovich, who had attempted to organize a filibustering expedition into the eastern provinces when the insurrection began in Bosnia. Federico Campanula was actively engaged in the work of the Società at Florence. He and Aurelio Saffi were the great republican leaders of Italy at the time. Domenico Barzalai, always an active Irredentist and later a member of the chamber of deputies, was located at Ancona. Among the correspondents were included the names of Carlo Combi and Giuseppe Fabris-Basilico.[20] The former could not have been an active associate. As for Basilico, he carried water on both shoulders, appearing to support the moderates while he assisted Imbriani and the radicals, and all the while not hesitating to accept funds from Austria for valuable information which he was able to collect from his contacts with all parties in the movement.[21] Imbriani hoped to absorb the Comitato of Combi and Luciani, thus unifying the entire Irredentist movement. But the negotiations to that end proved a failure since Combi refused to sacrifice his organization to the republicans. In a personal letter to Imbriani, September 19, 1877, Combi clearly stated his position: The society, Comitato nazionale, remains distinct, with its own principles, with its own program, with its own means. It therefore treats with the Società in pro deiritalia irredenta as person to person, regarding it as a friendly, fraternal, deserving society in so far as its purposes and methods conform to its own, and offering full support in everything which does not contradict its own principles. This must be clearly understood, for the society which you created with such patriotic zeal could be used for purposes quite contrary to our political faith.[22] [32] The Società, therefore, did not include the moderates but came to overshadow them through its formidable size and vigorous action. Adequate statistics on the number of members in Imbriani's Società do not exist in the Jerace collection. Francesco Jerace, who had personal connections with the organization and its leaders, has, however, expressed the opinion that the figure would reach the hundred-thousand mark.[23] This estimate may be somewhat high, certainly for the period immediately preceding the Congress of Berlin, when Imbriani himself was discouraged with the work;[24] but it would doubtless be no exaggeration for the months of July and August, 1878, when emotions were running high in the peninsula. At all events, the Società had already reached extensive proportions before the powers assembled in congress at Berlin. While the Near Eastern crisis was reviving hope among the older, moderate Irredentists and was contributing to the formation of the more powerful and active Società, the Italian press began to reflect a growing public interest in the Irredentist provinces. During the preceding decade few newspapers had been actively interested. But between 1876 and 1878 it is apparent that the press as a whole was favorably disposed toward Irredentist acquisitions, though it would be incorrect to say that a campaign in this sense was undertaken. Among the papers of larger circulation which intimated, even if they did not always clearly state, their sympathy for the Irredentist cause prior to the Congress of Berlin were:
The most active proponents of annexation were naturally newspapers of the radical stamp. Among the most prominent of these were:
It is clear that the idea of redeeming Italian peoples under the subjection of Austria was taking hold in the public mind during the first two years of Balkan troubles. As the crisis developing there approached a climax early in 1878, anxiety for a favorable settlement of the Irredentist issue increased noticeably. The government was advised from all sides that, in return for allowing at the congress an Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Italy should secure compensation on the northern and eastern frontier. Combi negotiated directly with the government to show that this was the wish of the moderates.[26] Even the leaders of Imbriani's Società, ominously silent before the congress, sought to impress officials with the necessity of taking such action at Berlin.[27] The press reflected the same general hope. On March 23, Nazione published a leading article entitled "Our frontiers with Austria." This contained a letter of Mario Manfroni, a native of the Trentino but at the time of writing, in the public service of the Italian government. The letter suggested, obviously with the congress in mind, that Italy speak clearly to Austria and say: "We will be with you if you give us the right bank of the Isonzo and the Trentino." In its editorial comment, the newspaper commended Manfroni's suggestions, stating that "his considerations regarding our present confines are all true."[28] Riforma dealt with the issue at much greater length in a series of articles from February through May of 1878. It objected to forcible annexations by any power, and recommended as the basis for all settlements at the congress the application of the principle of nationality, the general acceptance of which might have guaranteed Italy the Irredentist provinces. It warned the [34] government to "provide for its own interests," and insisted that upon the solution of the Eastern question "ought to depend the satisfaction of old national aspirations."[29] Opinione reaffirmed in April the ideas contained in a much disputed article of the same paper in October, 1876, an article in which the opinion that Italy must secure Irredentist annexations was ably expressed.[30] Diritto, mouthpiece of the Cairoli government, gave evidence of the same feeling.[31] This increasing popular interest in the Irredentist provinces was also reflected in the debates of parliament during March and April of 1878. The discussion of foreign affairs began on March 26 and revealed the whole range of opinions in the country, from the conservative Right to the advanced wing of the Left. The conservative minority held that Italy would gain nothing by then seeking a rectification of "the little territorial differences which exist between us and our powerful neighbor." On the other hand, it was the opinion of the Left, represented by Cavallotti of Milan, that the major concern for Italy at Berlin was the satisfaction of her national interests. The Milanese deputy's speech, received with great applause, concluded with the hope that from the Eastern crisis "peoples may emerge more satisfied in their aspirations, more content within their legitimate confines; that Italy may emerge freer, more secure, larger and more complete."[32] This growing desire on the part of the public for a favorable settlement of the Irredentist question placed the government in a most difficult position, not because officials looked upon these aspirations with disfavor but because they were already convinced that the great powers would make their satisfaction impossible. They had no reason to hope for a satisfactory settlement of the problem. Austrian objections to sacrificing Irredentist provinces were understood from the very beginning of the Near Eastern crisis. [35] As early as 1874 Count Andrassy, Austrian minister for foreign affairs, had clearly stated the imperial government's attitude: .... We could not consent to a modification of the order of things consecrated by treaties. We are hindered, above all, by the very principle which would be involved. When once an adjustment on the basis of ethnographic boundaries should be admitted by us, similar pretensions could be raised by others, and it would be almost impossible to reject them. In effect, we could not cede Italy the people belonging to her by language without artificially provoking in those nationalities on the frontiers of the Empire, a centrifugal movement toward the sister nationalities bordering our States. This movement would place us in the dilemma of resigning ourselves to the loss of these provinces, or, indeed .... of incorporating the bordering countries within the Monarchy.[33] Still more forcefully did Andrassy express himself to Count Robilant, Italian ambassador at Vienna, in October, 1876, when he warned Italy that no enlargement of our Monarchy .... could give Italy claim to compensation, and that we, at the first sign of an annexationist policy, would under no circumstances remain on the defensive but would proceed with the most resolute aggressive action.[34] This attitude was confirmed again and again during the Near Eastern crisis.[35] Unwilling to countenance the cession of her Italian subjects, Austria, however, seemed willing to let Italy have compensation in the Mediterranean.[36] Austria's position was thus clearly understood at Rome, but hope still prevailed that her hand might be forced.[37] Obviously, [36] Crispi had this in mind during his famous European tour in September and October, 1877. His attempt to win Germany over against Austria, however, was not only weakly made but was cleverly dismissed by Bismarck; and Lord Derby in England gave Crispi no encouragement.[38] In this respect, at least, Crispins negotiations were a dismal failure. Between the time of his mission and June, 1878, the foreign office at Rome, while constantly representing the possibility of serious Irredentist agitation if Austria secured Bosnia and Herzegovina, and even of having its hands forced thereby, was under no delusions as to the prospect of securing Irredentist territory.[39] With the defeat of the second Depretis ministry, March 8, 1878, and the successful formation of a Cairoli cabinet sixteen days later, there came a temporary renewal of optimism at Rome. Cairoli's sympathy for, and agitation in behalf of, Irredentism was generally recognized abroad, as was also that of Zanardelli, his minister of interior. While the Irredentists rejoiced, the great powers naturally looked upon Cairoli's accession to power with grave misgivings.[40] But however favorably disposed Cairoli and Zanardelli might have been toward Irredentist acquisitions, they were confronted from the beginning with obstacles which were, in fact, insurmountable. Count Luigi Corti, formerly ambassador at Constantinople, who had been prevailed upon to accept the direction of the foreign ministry under the new cabinet, did so only with the explicit understanding that the government would refrain from an adventurous policy in the settlement of the Eastern Question. He discouraged discussion in the chamber of "territorial [37] claims which are in contradiction with treaties solemnly arranged with that [Austrian] Empire/' and more than once held Cairoli and Zanardelli in check with threats of resignation.[41] As if Corti's action were not enough to prevent Cairoli and Zanardelli from setting up claims to Irredentist territory, both the English and German ambassadors added the strong advice of their governments against it. On June 5 Sir Augustus Paget, the English ambassador, engaged the prime minister in conversation on matters relating to the congress. He trusted that "whatever might happen in regard to the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austrian troops, the Italian plenipotentiaries would in no case receive instructions which might disturb the relations between Italy and Austria"; if they did, the Italian government must understand that "they might possibly be placing themselves in opposition to England." Paget further remarked that these observations were not merely his or his government's but represented also the sentiments of Germany, and that he was "enabled to say that if Italy brought forward the Trentino question she would do so at her own risk and peril. . . . ,"[42] Cairoli agreed that the time was inopportune to bring up the Trentino question but would not commit himself as to what his government "might do in certain eventualities." Lord Salisbury, the English foreign minister, entirely approved Paget's counsel to Cairoli. On the margin of the foreign office copy of the document in which this approval is expressed, Lord Beaconsfield commented that "Sir A. Paget certainly went a long way in giving advice to Signor Cairoli," and Salisbury remarked that "his language was too impetuous, but the policy was right."[43] The German ambassador, von Keudell, had preceded Paget in informing Cairoli that if Italy "wished to count upon the [38] friendship of Germany" she must seek no Irredentist compensation for Austria's occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[44] With good reason, then, the foreign office summary of Balkan affairs, compiled to assist the government in making plans for Berlin, concluded as to Bosnia and Herzegovina: In such a state of affairs, our opposition would necessarily be without useful purpose and would only have the effect of antagonizing the Powers, anxious for peace and intolerant of any new difficulties, of reviving the suspicion that we wish to reopen underhandedly the most difficult of the territorial questions which could be raised between Austria and Italy....[45] On June 7 the cabinet settled upon its official policy at Berlin. The instructions for the plenipotentiaries, of course, allowed for the temporary occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria, but left the way open for compensation claims if that occupation were designed to be permanent: If there is a question (although it does not seem probable) of a real and actual territorial annexation, the plenipotentiaries of His Majesty will sound the terrain to determine if it would conform to the interests and dignity of the king to propose a request for compensation. Count Corti and Count de Launay, ambassador to Germany, were delegated to carry out the Berlin mission.[46] In the eighth session of the congress, June 28, Count Andrassy raised the question as to the disposition of Bosnia and Herzegovina without making any suggestions as to the solution. Lord Salisbury then proposed that the two provinces be turned over to the Habsburg empire for administration, in the general interests of peace. Bismarck supported this proposal. So tense was the situation and so suspicious of Italy were the powers that, when Count Corti asked a simple question in regard to the matter, he received the dry reply from Andrassy that it was hoped the Italian government would appreciate Austrian occupation of the provinces no less than the rest of Europe. The question of compensation for Italy was not raised.[47] [39] Although it was a foregone conclusion that this would be the result of the congress, the Italian public was shocked at the news and the organized Irredentists were profoundly disappointed by it. The government was roundly denounced for its supposed incompetence; the great powers were accused of taking advantage of smaller and weaker nations; and Austria, the age-old enemy, became the special object of popular indignation. The excited state of the public mind prepared the way for active Irredentist agitation. The first reaction to the news of the Berlin settlement was a violent, popular demonstration at Venice. A group of citizens marched directly to the Austrian consulate to voice its indignation. Not content with mere verbal protests, the crowd proceeded to storm the building, tore down the Austrian coat-of-arms, and committed other acts of vandalism.[48] This demonstration appears to have been more spontaneous than planned, something which can scarcely be said of the others that followed elsewhere in Italy. The radical Irredentists of Imbriani's Società were apparently inspired by the Venetian incident to organize similar public meetings in behalf of the Irredentist cause. The first of these took place at Leghorn [Livorno] on July 4. Here a crowd gathered at the arena, where it manifested in favor of the Trentino and Trieste and then, following the example set at Venice, marched toward the Austrian consulate. The military and the police successfully thwarted this plan. The demonstrators then nominated a committee to undertake the erection of a memorial at Rome to the Irredenti, and disbanded. It is interesting to observe that this committee was composed of Menotti Garibaldi, Giuseppe Avezzana, Aurelio Saffi, and Federico Campanella, all of them republicans and associated with Imbriani's Società. Almost instantaneously the kingdom was visited with numerous Irredentist demonstrations similar to that at Livorno, touching practically every hamelt and city from the Alps to [40] Calabria. On July 14 a great meeting was held at Naples, presided over by General Avezzana, president of the Società. On the same day a considerable crowd gathered at the arena Goldoni in Florence to demonstrate in favor of Italia irredenta. It was reported that the applause for Trieste and the Trentino lasted fully a half-hour. A similar demonstration occurred at Genoa on July 20. The following day a popular meeting for the Irredentist territories was held in Rome. Menotti Garibaldi presided. In the evening an imposing number of demonstrators, supported by a band, collected in the Piazza Colonna, singing the hymn to Garibaldi. They then conducted a hostile demonstration before the Austrian embassy and finally marched in the direction of Cairoli's residence. A second demonstration before the Austrian embassy that same evening was prevented by the police. Also on July 21, Irredentist sympathizers collected at Milan, a meeting in which Cavallotti, member of the chamber of deputies and friend of Cairoli, actively participated. On July 28 a demonstration took place in the Victor Emmanuel theater at Ancona, presided over by Matteo Renato Imbriani himself. On August 4 meetings were held at Velletri, Livorno, and Cesena, Menotti Garibaldi and Aurelio Saffi presiding at the first and last of these, respectively. Four days later, on the anniversary of Austria's retreat in 1848, a great demonstration was held at Bologna, presided over by Aurelio Saffi and addressed by the republican poet, Giosu è Carducci.[49] This does not exhaust the list of meetings by any means, but it need not be further extended here.Certain similarities in all of these demonstrations are worth observing. In every important instance they transpired in those communities where branches of the Società in pro dell'Italia irredenta had been organized. In the most conspicuous of these, Imbriani, Menotti Garibaldi, Aurelio Saffi, Giuseppe Avezzana, or Federico Campanella, republicans and the guiding spirits of the Società, presided. In all of the meetings the method of procedure was practically the same. Attacks were directed against the Congress of Berlin, scathing criticisms were made of the [41] great powers, particularly Austria, and the government of the kingdom itself was condemned. All of the demonstrations were given considerable popular support, it having been estimated, for example, that crowds numbering from 1,500 to 2,000 participated at Naples and Florence, 3,000 at Rome, and that those elsewhere were correspondingly large. Two important conclusions can be reached from these facts:
The extent of this dissatisfaction was clearly reflected by a number of leading newspapers. Riforma, anticipating failure at the congress as early as June 16, accused the government of weakness in not providing for the northern and eastern frontiers. After the Venetian demonstration, it condemned the government for having apologized to Austria.[50] Piccolo (Naples), usually representative of moderate ideas, vigorously denounced Corti's policies at Berlin, asserting that Austrian domination of Italian nationals had been strengthened by the congress and that the national program for acquisition of the Irredentist provinces had taken "an immense step backward."[51] Dovere (Rome—republican) even suggested that Irredentist demonstrations should be held at Rome.[52] Less violent in their criticisms of the government, but among those obviously disappointed with the settlement of the congress, were a number of the more moderate papers. The most representative of these were: Opinione, Pugnolo, Corriere delta sera, Nazione, Perseveranza, and Gazzetta di Venezia. By the middle of August, however, this first wave of popular discontent had begun to subside. During the next few months something like a normal balance was restored to the public mind. The Irredentist meetings sponsored by Imbriani lost in [42] popularity and then shortly ceased. The press, led by Opinione, began a veritable crusade against violent agitation of the piazza. [53] Public-spirited men, such as Niccola Marselli and Stefano Jacini, sought to calm the public passion through popular pamphlets.[54] The resignations of Corti and the ministers of war and marine in October, after Cairoli and Zanardelli committed the government to what Corti construed as license for unlimited agitation, brought added recognition of the possible serious consequences of public demonstrations. The attempt upon King Umberto and the wounding of Cairoli in November added proof for many that unbridled radical manifestations were unwise. With the subsequent resignation of the Cairoli ministry, the radical Irredentists lost in the government one who was sympathetic with their cause. As support for their agitation waned between August and December, the radical Irredentists, taking a leaf from the previous history of Italy, withdrew for secret conspiracy and violent action. Early in September the news got about that various branches of the Società were calling for enrolments of volunteers, were instituting target practice, and were contemplating invasion of Austrian territory.[55] These reports were discredited at Rome;[56] but indeed they were true, as officials in the government knew.[57] [43] Exactly when these ideas took shape in the minds of the Society's leaders is still, and perhaps will remain, an uncertainty. There is some evidence, however, to support the belief that they were conceived almost as early as the founding of the organization. At all events, Garibaldi, who had been wholeheartedly adopted by the Società, drew up plans as early as January, 1878, for an invasion of Trieste and the Trentino, to assure Italy's possession there "at the next congress." Preparatory measures for the execution of this plan were carried out between January and October in co-operation with a native of the Trentino, Antonio Zanolli, who made a secret military investigation of that province and later presented a bill for 130 lire to the Società for services performed.[58] Furthermore, there are indications in the correspondence of associates of the Società between January and June, 1878, that the idea of armed intervention was under consideration.[59] There can be little doubt that the Società had in mind the idea of military intervention in the Irredentist territories months before the Congress of Berlin assembled. These plans were held in abeyance until the results of the congress were known. When the Italian plenipotentiaries returned with empty hands, it was natural that the Irredentists should again give serious consideration to military intervention. On July 21 Garibaldi, in a telegram to the meeting at Rome, urged that preparations for military action in the Irredentist provinces be immediately undertaken.60 Simultaneously Imbriani appears to have [44] sounded out the leading members of the Società to discover their opinions of such action. In general, they approved.[61] It was then that the central committee proceeded to organize within the Società secret committees of action, empowered to enrol volunteers who were to be instructed in the military arts and stand ready for subsequent action. These secret committees, each with five members, were formed within the already existing committees and were instructed to concentrate the whole of their attention upon mobilization.[62] It is not clear when the first of these were created, but thirty-three of them were in existence by October.[63] Again, there is no precise information about the time when the committees began to enrol volunteers, although there is evidence that considerable progress had been made by September, 1878.[64] In a general meeting of the Società convened at Forli, October 19, an attempt was made to co-ordinate the efforts of the secret committees and more clearly to define their purpose. The deliberations resulted in two resolutions, one for public dissemination and the other, of a secret nature, to serve as the program of action.[65] The latter was taken by a select group of forty, representing the principal committees. It recommended that the secret committees "be fully prepared by the coming spring" when "at an opportune time the period of action" would be decided upon; and it obligated each secret committee "(1) to select men determined and ready for any dangerous undertaking, and upon whom one could unquestionably rely; (2) to provide the necessary arms for these men; (3) to provide economic means in the measure necessary for their mobilization; (4) to [45] complete this preparatory work within the month of March, 1879.[66] Provision was made that each group of volunteers join a national society of Tiro a Segno (Marksmen) which was under the direction of the Società. The central committee at Naples drew up a constitution for this organization.[67] It described in considerable detail the duties and obligations of the various members. Target practice was arranged for Sunday in the provincial district reserved for such purposes. Attendance was made compulsory, infractions of the rule being punishable by fine or expulsion. Each member was to receive instructions in the names, use, and care of all types of arms. Regular reports on the progress of each company of volunteers were to be sent to the superior committee within the society.[68] To maintain the secret purpose of this organization more effectively, correspondence relating to it was to be reduced to a minimum, and that carefully safeguarded. Thus the central committee at Naples was to write of these matters only to the committees of organization, and all communications from the secret committees were to be sent in registered letters to Im-briani or Miss Thusnelda von Sommer at Naples.[69] It is not clear what parts, if all, of the Irredentist provinces were to be invaded by the volunteers. Evidence from Antonio Zanolli would indicate that the plan of invading the Trentino was temporarily abandoned at Forli in order to concentrate upon Trieste and Istria.[70] There is nothing in the Jerace collection to contradict this, although the references to intervention make it appear that there was a vague notion of invading all the provinces even after the Forli meeting. There was less uncertainty about the time for invasion and the plan of its execution. The leaders of the Società fully expected that the venture would be undertaken in April, 1879.[71] [46] General Garibaldi roughly outlined the plan then to be followed :
Obviously, the invasion by armed forces was to be coincident with an insurrection of the native Italians in the Irredentist territories. There is every indication that the plans for invasion were well advanced in the autumn of 1878. Someone had even prepared an elaborate treatise of twenty pages "of some ideas on the manner of organizing the expedition.[73] So far indeed had all of this gone that the prime minister, Benedetto Cairoli, was requested to make known the attitude of the government if the invasion were undertaken.[74] Cairoli, despite his sympathy for the Irredentist cause, informed the plotters that he would use all the means his position afforded him to suppress the invasion if it were attempted.[75] Undoubtedly, this helped to prevent the undertaking. Yet, had it been decided upon even in the face of official opposition, it is difficult to see how anything but disaster could have resulted. The volunteer companies, so active in September and October, began to disintegrate through lack of the necessary finances, and the natives of the Irredentist provinces showed no desire to [47] insurrect.[76] The idea of invasion had not been discarded by the end of 1878, but it was no longer seriously considered. The violent agitation and conspiracy of 1877 and 1878 was new to the Irredentist movement and obviously resulted from the combined effects of liberal government and the Near Eastern crisis. In contrast with the previous epoch, Irredentism was now essentially republican, radical, violent, and organized on a national scale. There is no evidence that it enjoyed popular support in Italy, except for the brief period of a few weeks after the Congress of Berlin. There is no evidence that the government co-operated directly with the radicals, although it tolerated them. But the agitation was so planned and executed as to give the appearance of both public and official support, and so the great powers were inclined to construe it. In the immediate future, Italy's foreign relations were to suffer from the suspicions aroused in 1878 and from the tendency toward violence which thereafter characterized the activities of a number of Irredentists. Syracuse University |
Notes:
Scipione Salvotti to the committee at Naples, Mar. 21, 1879, J.C. Source:
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This page compliments of Marisa Ciceran Created:
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September 29, 2007; Last updated:
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