Source: http://www.firstworldwar.com/

Primary Documents

• May 20, 1882 - Triple Alliance
• Aug. 2, 1914 - Italy's declaration of Neutrality
• Treaty of London, aka London Pact (Patto di Londra, in Italian)
• May 23, 1915 - Italy's entry into the war

Triple Alliance, 20 May 1882

Negotiated and signed in May 1881, the Triple Alliance brought Italy into the alliance previously agreed between Germany and Austria-Hungary (in 1879) as a counterweight to France and Russia.

Under the provisions of this treaty, Germany and Austria-Hungary promised to assist Italy if she were attacked by France, and vice versa: Italy was bound to lend aid to Germany or Austria-Hungary if France declared war against either.

Additionally, should any signatory find itself at war with two powers (or more), the other two were to provide military assistance.

One of the chief aims of the Triple Alliance was to prevent Italy from declaring war against Austria-Hungary, towards whom the Italians were in constant dispute over territorial matters.

Although regularly renewed up until the outbreak of war in 1915, the Triple Alliance was essentially ineffective with regard to Italy’s participation, for in 1902 (just five months after the latest renewal of the Alliance) Italy reached an understanding with France that each would remain neutral in the event of an attack upon the other.

Abridged Text of the Triple Alliance

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties mutually promise peace and friendship, and will enter into no alliance or engagement directed against any one of their States.

They engage to proceed to an exchange of ideas on political and economic questions of a general nature which may arise, and they further promise one another mutual support within the limits of their own interests.

Article 2

 In case Italy, without direct provocation on her part, should be attacked by France for any reason whatsoever, the two other Contracting Parties shall be bound to lend help and assistance with all their forces to the Party attacked.

This same obligation shall devolve upon Italy in case of any aggression without direct provocation by France against Germany.

Article 3

If one, or two, of the High Contracting Parties, without direct provocation on their part, should chance to be attacked and to be engaged in a war with two or more Great Powers non-signatory to the present Treaty, the casus foederis will arise simultaneously for all the High Contracting Parties.

Article 4

In case a Great Power non-signatory to the present Treaty should threaten the security of the states of one of the High Contracting Parties, and the threatened Party should find itself forced on that account to make war against it, the two others bind themselves to observe towards their Ally a benevolent neutrality. Each of them reserves to itself, in this case, the right to take part in the war, if it should see fit, to make common cause with its Ally.

Article 5

If the peace of any of the High Contracting Parties should chance to be threatened under the circumstances foreseen by the preceding Articles, the High Contracting Parties shall take counsel together in ample time as to the military measures to be taken with a view to eventual cooperation.

They engage henceforward, in all cases of common participation in a war, to conclude neither armistice, nor peace, nor treaty, except by common agreement among themselves.

Article 6

The High Contracting Parties mutually promise secrecy as to the contents and existence of the present Treaty.

Article 7

The present Treaty shall remain in force during the space of five years, dating from the day of the exchange of ratifications.

Article 8

The ratifications of the present Treaty shall be exchanged at Vienna within three weeks, or sooner if may be.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have annexed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at Vienna, the twentieth day of the month of May of the year one thousand eight hundred and eighty-two.

(L.S.) KALNOKY
(L.S.) H. VII v. REUSS
(L.S.) C. ROBILANT

Ministerial Declaration

The Royal Italian Government declares that the provisions of the secret Treaty concluded May 20, 1882, between Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Germany, cannot, as has been previously agreed, in any case be regarded as being directed against England.

Italian Declaration of Neutrality, 2 August 1914

With war brewing in Europe towards the close of July 1914 both the Entente Powers (Britain, France and Russia) and the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary) were keen to secure an alliance with Italy.

Matters were somewhat complicated by Italy's having committed itself to two apparently conflicting alliances.  The first, with Germany and Austria-Hungary - the Triple Alliance of 1882 - was publicly known and understood; the second, with France, was a secret alliance.

In the event Italy formally announced a policy of neutrality on 2 August. Her reason was straightforward: her alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary only provided for military support in the event of a defensive war: whereas Austria-Hungary's stance with regard to Serbia was clearly offensive.  More to the point however Italy regarded Austria-Hungary's influence in the Balkans with deep suspicion and had long regarded the Austro-Hungarians as potential enemies.

Her alliance with France ultimately led to Italy's entrance into the war, on 23 May 1915, on the side of the Entente Powers against Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Italian Entry into the War, 23 May 1915

Having declared a policy of neutrality at the outset of the war on 2 August 1914, the Italian government was eventually persuaded to enter the war on the side of the Allies in May 1915.

Italy's decision to enter the war was largely driven by the terms of the secret 1915 Treaty of London under which she had been promised large territorial gains at the close of the war at Austria-Hungary's expense.

On 23 May 1915, the day Italy joined the war, the Italian Prime Minister, Antonio Salandra, issued the following declaration of support for the Allies.

23 May 1915
Italian Premier Antonio Salandra's
Declaration for the Allies

Biography

I address myself to Italy and to the civilized world in order to show not by violent words, but by exact facts and documents, how the fury of our enemies has vainly attempted to diminish the high moral and political dignity of the cause which our arms will make prevail. I shall speak with the calm of which the King of Italy has given a noble example, when he called his land and sea forces to arms. I shall speak with the respect due to my position and to the place in which I speak. I can afford to ignore the insults written in Imperial, Royal, and Archducal proclamations. Since I speak from the Capitol, and represent in this solemn hour the people and the Government of Italy, I, a modest citizen, feel that I am far nobler than the head of the house of the Hapsburgs.

The commonplace statesmen who, in rash frivolity of mind and mistaken in all their calculations, set fire last July to the whole of Europe and even to their own hearths and homes, have now noticed their fresh colossal mistake, and in the Parliaments of Budapest and Berlin have poured forth brutal invective of Italy and her Government with the obvious design of securing the forgiveness of their fellow-citizens and intoxicating them with cruel visions of hatred and blood. The German Chancellor said he was imbued not with hatred, but with anger, and he spoke the truth because he reasoned badly, as is usually the case in fits of rage. I could not, even if I chose, imitate their language. An atavistic throwback to primitive barbarism is more difficult for us who have twenty centuries behind us more than they have.

The fundamental thesis of the statesmen of Central Europe is to be found in the words "treason and surprise on the part of Italy toward her faithful allies." It would be easy to ask if he has any right to speak of alliance and respect for treaties who, representing with infinitely less genius, but with equal moral indifference, the tradition of Frederick the Great and Bismarck, proclaimed that necessity know no law, and consented to his country trampling under foot and burying at the bottom of the ocean all the documents and all the customs of civilization and international law. But that would be too easy an argument. Let us examine, on the contrary, positively and calmly, if our former allies are entitled to say that they were betrayed and surprised by us....

The horrible crime of Sarajevo was exploited as a pretext a month after it happened -- this was proved by the refusal of Austria to accept the very extensive offers of Serbia -- nor at the moment o the general conflagration would Austria have been satisfied with the unconditional acceptance of the ultimatum. Count Berchtold on July 31st declared to the Duke of Avarna that, if there had been a possibility of mediation being exercised, it could not have interrupted hostilities, which had already begun with Serbia. This was the mediation for which Great Britain and Italy were working. In any case, Count Berchtold was not disposed to accept mediation tending to weaken the conditions indicated in the Austrian note, which, naturally, would have been increased at the end of the war....

Where is, then, the treason, the iniquity, the surprise, if, after nine months of vain efforts to reach an honorable understanding which recognized in equitable measure our rights and our liberties, we resumed liberty of action? The truth is that Austria and Germany believed until the last days that they had to deal with an Italy weak, blustering, but not acting, capable of trying blackmail, but not enforcing by arms her good right, with an Italy which could be paralyzed by spending a few millions, and which by dealings which she could not avow was placing herself between the country and the Government.

The effect was the contrary. An immense outburst of indignation was kindled throughout Italy and not among the populace, but among the nobles of the country, which is ready to shed its blood for the nation. This outburst of indignation was kindled as the result of the suspicion that a foreign Ambassador was interfering between the Italian Government, the Parliament, and the country. In the blaze thus kindled internal discussions melted away, and the whole nation was joined in a wonderful moral union, which will prove our greatest source of strength in the severe struggle which faces us, and which must lead us by our own virtue, and not by benevolent concessions from others, to the accomplishment of the highest destinies of the country.

Antonio Salandra

Antonio Salandra (1853-1931) served as Italy's Prime Minister from the outbreak of war in Europe until his resignation two years later following military defeat at the Trentino in May 1916.

Born in Troia, Puglia to a wealthy family on 13 August 1853, Salandra was educated in law and was professor of administrative science at the University of Rome before deciding to enter politics.

An authoritarian conservative, Salandra's political career saw steady progress. He was appointed Minister for Agriculture in 1899 and Finance Minister seven years later (and again in 1909-10).

Taking office as Prime Minister in March 1914 in the wake of a political crisis and with shortages caused by the Turkish war of 1911-12 commonplace, Salandra was seen by many as merely a stop-gap premier. Indeed it is probable that his administration would have fallen by mid-summer had not the July Crisis intervened, halting the riots that had broken out in June.

Salandra publicly announced Italy's policy of neutrality on 2 August, reflecting popular opinion across the nation. This was despite Italy's membership of the Central Powers alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary.

However Italy (which had earlier negotiated a secret treaty with France in any event) escaped its obligations by citing Austria-Hungary's decision to attack Serbia without first notifying Italy as providing legitimate cause for the latter's policy of neutrality.

Salandra, who was determined to pursue a policy of Italian self-interest, was eventually persuaded that Italy's future was best served by entering the war on the side of the Allies. His hand was strengthened when he came away from the secret 1915 Treaty of London with commitments from the Allies to support Italian territorial ambitions after the war (chiefly at the expense of Austria-Hungary).

Finally entering the fray on 23 May 1915 on a wave of popular support, Salandra hoped for a relatively short war with the prospect of sweeping Italian territorial gains. He was to be disappointed in both.

With military policy firmly dictated by Chief of Staff Luigi Cadorna - who repeatedly resisted Salandra's ineffectual attempts to assert political control of the military campaign - Italy failed to make any significant gains despite innumerable attempts along the Isonzo (eleven battles in all).

At last, with defeat at the Trentino in May 1916, Salandra's government fell on 10 June 1916, the first to do so among the Allies. Salandra played no further wartime role in either the Boselli or Orlando administrations, although he served as a delegate at Versailles and subsequently represented Italy at the League of Nations.

After the war Salandra's brand of conservatism led him to initially support Benito Mussolini and his fascist policies, although he later modified his position. He was made a senator by Mussolini in 1928.

Antonio Salandra died in Rome on 9 December 1931 at the age of 78.

Sources:

• First Worldwar.com, Primary Documents - Italian Entry into the World War, 23 May 1915
• http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/italianneutrality.htm

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